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Abstract 
 
Photographs of people are commonly said to be Ôgood likenessesÕ or Ôpoor likenessesÕ, and 
this is a concept that we readily understand. Despite this, there has been no systematic 
investigation of what makes an image a good likeness, or of which cognitive processes are 
involved in making such a judgement. In three experiments, we investigate likeness 
judgements for different types of images: natural images of film stars (Experiment 1), images 
of film stars from specific films (Experiment 2), and iconic images and face averages 
(Experiment 3). In all three experiments, participants rated images for likeness and completed 
speeded name verification tasks. We consistently show that participants are faster to identify 
images which they have previously rated as a good likeness compared to a poor likeness. We 
also consistently show that the more familiar we are with someone, the higher likeness rating 
we give to all images of them. A key finding is that our perception of likeness is idiosyncratic 
(Experiments 1 and 2), and can be tied to our specific experience of each individual 
(Experiment 2). We argue that likeness judgements require a comparison between the 
stimulus and our own representation of the person, and that this representation differs 
according to our prior experience with that individual. This has theoretical implications for 
our understanding of how we represent familiar people, and practical implications for how we 
go about selecting images for identity purposes such as photo-ID. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Facial likeness; familiarity; iconic images; face averages; prototype; mental 
representation. 
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1. Introduction 
We all understand what it is to say that a particular image of someone is a good likeness. In 
fact, likeness is considered important for official forms of photo-ID, with passport-issuing 
offices around the world requiring someone familiar with the applicant to verify the likeness 
of the passport image (Australian Passport Office, 2012; Passport Canada, 2013; HM 
Passport Office, 2014). Despite this, there has been no systematic investigation of why 
observers pick out one image as a good likeness while considering another to be a bad 
likeness. 
 
A number of different techniques in research on face recognition have used the concept of 
likeness as a key measure in the success of their manipulation. For example, studies 
manipulating the distinctiveness of face images (Allen, Brady & Tredoux, 2009; Lee & 
Perrett, 2000), research on the caricaturing effect (Benson & Perrett, 1991; Rhodes, Brennan 
& Carey, 1987), and research on face composites (Bruce, Ness, Hancock, Newman & Rarity, 
2002; Frowd et al., 2014) all used ratings of likeness as the dependent measure. Yet none 
have defined what this term means, relying on the fact that we all, participants and readers 
alike, intuitively understand the concept of likeness. Such an understanding seems to rely on 
the notion that a good likeness closely matches a canonical representation of a known person, 
or is perhaps some kind of Ôsuper-stimulusÕ providing efficient access to such a 
representation, as has sometimes been claimed for caricatures.   
 
When we consider different types of photos, we can see that one person can look very 
different across images depending on what they are trying to achieve in each (e.g., Leikas, 
Verkasalo, & Lnnqvist, 2013). For example, someoneÕs passport photo will look different 
from their work website photo or their holiday photos. Previous work has shown that 
observers familiar with the person pictured can easily see that multiple, varied photos show 
the same person, whereas unfamiliar observers struggle to identify the same person across 
multiple images (e.g., Jenkins, White, van Montfort & Burton, 2011; Laurence & Mondloch, 
2016). The same is true even when only two images are pictured side by side and observers 
are asked to indicate whether the images show the same person or two different people. This 
task is easy for familiar viewers but significantly more difficult for unfamiliar viewers 
(Bruce, Henderson, Newman & Burton, 2001; Clutterbuck & Johnston, 2002, 2004; Ritchie 
et al., 2015). Here, the difference between familiar and unfamiliar viewers seems to be their 
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capacity to cope with a range of variability across different photos of the same person. With 
increased familiarity comes an ability to recognise a person from an increased range of 
images. Here we test whether familiarity also leads to an increased tolerance to the range of 
images one would categorise as being a good likeness. 
 
In an earlier systematic exploration of our ability to recognise and provide information (such 
as occupation) about familiar people from face images, the most common reason participants 
gave for failing to recognise a familiar person (71% of recognition failures) was that the 
photo was a Ôbad likenessÕ (Hay, Young & Ellis, 1991). The authors go on to quote 
participantsÕ responses, giving examples such as ÒthatÕs not what I remember him looking 
likeÓ, and ÒsheÕs much younger in that photographÓ (Hay, Young & Ellis, 1991, p. 778). One 
of the most interesting observations made was that different participants gave bad likeness 
responses to different images. This suggests that there is not something inherently poor about 
any given image, leading to all participants failing to recognise the same images. Rather, 
when each individual tries to recognise a familiar person, they compare the image under 
consideration with their own representation of that person. Each individualÕs representation 
of a person differs due to different levels of exposure to, or familiarity with, each target 
person, and so different images are a poor likeness for different observers.  
 
Perhaps the most familiar face for a person is their own, and a recent study has shown that the 
images which participants select as a good likeness of themselves are, in fact, not optimal for 
identifying them (White, Burton & Kemp, 2016). Participants ranked images of their own 
face for likeness, and a separate group of participants who were previously unfamiliar with 
these people also ranked the images for likeness after seeing a short video clip of each 
person. The images selected by this group as a good likeness, along with those selected by the 
participants themselves, were then used in a face matching task where two images were 
presented side by side, and a new group of participants were asked to judge whether or not 
the two images showed the same person. The images chosen by the participants themselves 
yielded lower accuracy on the matching task than the images selected by (unfamiliar) others. 
The results show that likeness judgements change as familiarity with the person pictured 
changes. 
 
Jenkins et al. (2011) investigated the relationship between familiarity with celebrities and 
likeness ratings for multiple images of those celebrities. Participants rated multiple images of 
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celebrities for likeness on a seven-point scale (extremely poor to extremely good likeness). 
Mean likeness ratings for images of each celebrity were positively correlated with the 
percentage of participants who recognised each celebrity. The results also showed that the 
variability in likeness ratings for multiple images of one celebrity could be greater than the 
variability in ratings between celebrities. Importantly, this approach used group means across 
participants. However, following from the earlier finding by Hay et al. (1991) that 
participants rated different images as a poor likeness, it may be more beneficial to analyse 
likeness ratings for each participant individually, rather than using group means. 
 
What does it mean, therefore, for an image to be Ôa good likenessÕ? Likeness judgements rely 
on a comparison between a physical stimulus and our own representation of an identity. The 
nature of this representation is unclear. As we become familiar with someone, we see 
multiple, variable instances of them which we need to be able to reconcile as the same 
person. Previous research has shown that when presented with multiple images of a person, 
viewers automatically extract the mean of the set (Kramer, Ritchie & Burton, 2015), and it 
has been suggested that these averages provide us with stable representations of people 
(Burton, Jenkins, Hancock & White, 2005; Frowd et al., 2014; Robertson, Kramer & Burton, 
2015). We might also represent some familiar celebrities through an ÔiconicÕ or famous image 
(Allen et al., 2009; Carbon, 2008). In an experiment using common and uncommon images of 
celebrity faces, participants were able to recognise and name celebrities from commonly-seen 
or iconic images (~80% accuracy), but recognition rate dropped dramatically (~25%) when 
participants were shown uncommon images of the celebrities (Carbon, 2008). The results 
suggest that we recognise some celebrities from specific, commonly-seen images. 
 
In the current research, we have sought to explore factors underlying likeness judgements for 
familiar faces. Underpinning this work is the idea that an image which is rated as being a 
good likeness should more closely resemble the raterÕs idea of what that person truly looks 
like in comparison with an image which is rated as a poorer likeness. We build on previous 
research which has shown that observers recognise a familiar individual across many variable 
images, suggesting that each of these images resembles their idea of what this person truly 
looks like. This study also follows on from the finding of Jenkins et al. (2011) that the more 
participants in a group who were familiar with a given celebrity, the higher the group likeness 
ratings for multiple images of that celebrity. These premises lead to three testable predictions: 
1) it will be easier for an observer to recognise someone from an image which they perceive 
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to be a good likeness of that person; 2) raters who are highly familiar with a person will have 
seen many images of them, and so will give higher likeness ratings to a larger range of 
images than will a less familiar viewer; 3) the specific images that each rater gives high 
likeness ratings to will be linked to their own experience of each person, and so likeness 
ratings will be different from one observer to the next.  
 
In Experiment 1, we addressed the relationship between familiarity with a celebrity and 
likeness ratings given to images of them, as well as the idiosyncratic nature of likeness 
ratings. We examined individual and group variance in ratings (Hnekopp, 2006) to 
investigate the idiosyncratic nature of the perception of likeness. In addition, participants 
completed a speeded name verification task. If the perception of likeness from images maps 
on to the mental representation of identities, then it is reasonable to hypothesise that the 
higher the likeness rating, the faster that image will be verified as picturing the named 
identity. Experiment 2 explored the association between likeness ratings and observersÕ own 
prior experiences with each celebrity using images from films which participants had or had 
not seen. Finally, Experiment 3 looked at other types of images which have previously been 
suggested as candidates for representing familiar people (face averages) and certain 
celebrities (iconic images), and tested whether these types of images are given higher likeness 
ratings than other images. 
 
2. Experiment 1 Ð The idiosyncratic nature of likeness perception 
 
In order to test whether the perception of likeness is specific to each individual observer, we 
used a technique which allows us to differentiate between individual and group variance in 
likeness ratings. We asked observers to rate images for likeness twice, allowing us to 
determine whether variance in likeness ratings is explained predominantly by private or 
shared variance (following Hnekopp, 2006). We hypothesised that private perception of 
likeness (each personÕs idiosyncratic perceptions) would explain more variance than shared 
perceptions of likeness (agreement across the group) since what constitutes a good likeness 
could be different for each observer. If the perception of likeness is tied to each observerÕs 
familiarity with the person in question, observers may give higher likeness ratings for images 
of highly familiar compared with less familiar celebrities. We also tested whether likeness 
ratings were related to ease of recognition using a speeded name verification task. After 
rating the images for likeness, participates were shown the name of a celebrity followed by 
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either an image of them or of another celebrity. If images rated as a good likeness are more 
easily recognised, we predicted that reaction times on the speeded name verification task 
would be faster for those images previously rated as a good compared to a poor likeness. 
 
2.1. Method 
 
2.1.1. Participants 
Thirty-five participants (5 men; mean age: 19 years, range: 18-32 years) took part. All were 
students or other members of the University of York, UK, or the University of Lincoln, UK.  
 
2.1.2. Materials and Procedure 
We used 15 images of each of 5 male Hollywood celebrities (Brad Pitt, Hugh Jackman, Matt 
Damon, Tom Cruise, and Tom Hanks). Hollywood celebrities were chosen to maximise the 
likelihood that all participants were familiar with all celebrities. Images were taken from a 
Google Image search specifying high resolution, broadly front-on face images. These varied 
in environmental factors such as lighting, head angle, expression, as well as person-based 
factors such as age, facial expression, hairstyle, etc. (see Figure 1 for examples). All images 
were cropped to show just the head, although backgrounds were not removed. Participants 
began with a familiarity measure in which they were shown the name of each celebrity and 
asked to rate how familiar they were with each person on a scale from 1 (not very familiar) to 
7 (very familiar). In the ratings task, participants viewed all 75 images in a random order, and 
were asked to indicate how good a likeness of that celebrity each image was. The likeness 
rating used a 1 to 7 scale from Ôvery bad likenessÕ to Ôvery good likenessÕ. After rating each 
image once, participants had a short break before rating each image a second time (again, in a 
novel random order). Participants also rated the images for trustworthiness and dominance, 
the results of which are not presented here.  
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Figure 1. Example stimuli for Experiment 1. Multiple images showing the same identity, but 
varying in lighting, colouring, hairstyle, etc. [Copyright restrictions prevent publication of the 
actual images used, though these are available from the authors. Images in Figure 1 are 
illustrative of the experimental stimuli, and depict someone who did not appear in the 
experiments but has given permission for the images to be reproduced here.]  
 
Following the ratings task, participants completed a speeded name verification task. A name 
was displayed on the screen for 1500 ms, and then replaced by an image which remained on 
the screen until response. On half of the trials, the face matched the name. Participants 
responded via button press, indicating whether the image showed the same person as the 
name or not, and were instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. There 
were 15 match trials per identity, each showing the person named, and the images previously 
rated for likeness. The 15 mismatch trials per name showed 5 images of three of the other 
identities, counterbalanced across identities to ensure each name and each person were seen 
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equally often. The images used for the mismatch trials were novel images which had not been 
seen during the likeness ratings phase of the experiment.   
 
2.2. Results and Discussion 
All participants reported knowing who each celebrity was (although their familiarity with 
each identity varied) prior to the experiment. For all correlations presented here, r values 
were converted to z using FisherÕs r-to-z transformation (which corrects the skew in the 
distribution of r). These z-scores were then compared to zero using a two-tailed, one-sample 
t-test, where a value significantly different from zero indicates an association between the 
two variables at the individual level (e.g., Back et al., 2010; Kramer, Gottwald, Dixon, & 
Ward, 2012). Where no relationship is present, the distribution of correlations (z-scores) will 
not differ from zero. In other words, we focused on individual-level correlations and whether 
their distribution differed from zero, whereas researchers often average across participants 
and then correlate rated familiarity and likeness ratings, for example. The Ôaverage of 
correlationsÕ approach used here allows us to focus on the responses of single observers, 
crucial for analyses where we expect each person to respond differently based on their 
personal experiences, whereas individual-level mechanisms can be missed or relationships 
can be inflated if we average across participants and then correlate these results (e.g., Monin 
& Oppenheimer, 2005).  
 
We began by correlating rated familiarity with mean likeness ratings. For each participant, 
we calculated a Spearman rank correlation between their rated familiarity with each celebrity 
and their mean likeness rating of the 15 images of that celebrity in both the first and second 
rating blocks. There was a general positive correlation between familiarity and mean likeness 
score for both participantsÕ first ratings (z = .230, t(31) = 2.243, p = .032, d = .40 (comparing 
to zero), and second ratings (z = .290, t(31) = 2.158, p = .039, d = .38). These results extend 
those of Jenkins et al. (2011) who showed that the more participants in the group who 
reported being familiar with a celebrity, the higher the group likeness rating for that celebrity. 
Here we have shown this at the individual level Ð the more familiar a person is with a 
celebrity, the higher likeness rating they give to images of that person. 
 
Using the two likeness ratings of each image per participant, we carried out an analysis of 
private versus shared variance following methods previously used for attractiveness ratings 
(Hnekopp, 2006). Using this analysis, we found a greater contribution of private in 
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comparison with shared variance when explaining participantsÕ likeness ratings (beholder 
index, bi1 = .64). Here, we considered absolute differences in judgesÕ scores to be 
unimportant in that we assumed general differences between judges reflected a difference in 
scale use. (Note that if we considered judge-score differences to be meaningful then our 
indices reported here would be underestimates of the amount of private taste.) Our result 
means that 64% of the meaningful variance stable across time was due to a private perception 
of likeness, with the remaining 36% of variance shared across participants. As such, the 
perception of likeness is to a greater extent specific to each individual observer rather than 
being agreed upon across observers. 
 
We explored the effects of familiarity and likeness ratings on the speeded naming of each 
celebrity image. Error rates for the speeded name verification task were very low (mean 
of 3.5 errors from 75 trials per participant). For the RT analysis, we took RTs only for 
name/face match pairs in the speeded name verification task to which participants responded 
correctly. We excluded trials for which the RT was 2 SDs above or below that participantÕs 
mean RT (M = 4.58 trials excluded per participant). For each participant, we correlated their 
familiarity ratings for the five celebrities with their mean reaction time per celebrity in the 
speeded name verification task. We then converted these Spearman r values to z and 
averaged across the five z values to obtain one familiarity/RT correlation value for each 
participant. There was a negative correlation between familiarity and mean reaction time 
which was significantly different from zero (mean z = -.423, t(31) = 3.125, p = .004, 
d = .552). This shows that participants are faster to identify celebrities that they are more 
familiar with. The images for name/face match trials in the speeded name verification task 
were the same images as had previously been rated for likeness, allowing us to look at the 
relationship between likeness ratings and reaction times for each image. For each participant, 
we correlated their RT for each image with their likeness rating for that image, separately for 
each celebrity. This gave us five correlation values for each participant. Again, by converting 
these to z scores, we could then take the mean of these values, obtaining one likeness/RT 
correlation value for each participant. The negative correlation between mean likeness rating 
and mean RT was significantly different from zero (mean z = -.110, t(34) = 3.718, p = .001, 
d = .628). In this experiment, we found faster reaction times for individual images which had 
previously been rated as a good likeness.  
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Here, we have shown evidence of the idiosyncrasy in judgements of likeness. Sixty-four 
percent of the variance in likeness ratings was explained by a private rather than shared 
perception of likeness, supporting our hypothesis that what constitutes a good likeness is 
different for each observer. These results also show that participants were faster to identify 
celebrities with whom they were most familiar. Furthermore, we have shown that 
participantsÕ reaction times for each image reflect their likeness rating for that image, with 
images rated as a better likeness being identified more quickly.  
 
To pursue the idea that the perception of likeness is specific to the observerÕs previous 
experience, we conducted a second experiment using images from films. It is possible that 
participants had not previously seen the images used in the first experiment presented here 
since the images were gathered from internet search, and typically showed the celebrities at 
film premieres and other public events. Although these types of images are likely to appear in 
magazines, the more common way of seeing these Hollywood celebrities is starring in films, 
portraying particular characters. We carried out a second experiment using images from films 
in order to tie the experimental images to participantsÕ own previous experience of the 
celebrities through the films they have seen. 
 
 
 
3. Experiment 2 Ð Likeness tied to specific exposures 
 
This experiment followed the methods of Experiment 1 but used images from specific films 
as opposed to images of the celebrities out of character. Our previous experiments suggest 
that the perception of likeness differs from one observer to the next, presumably based on 
their prior experience of each celebrity. Using images from films allowed us explicitly to 
establish whether each participant had previously seen each image, based on whether or not 
they had seen each film.  
 
3.1. Method 
 
3.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-two participants (3 men; mean age: 20 years, range: 17-30 years) took part. All were 
students of the University of York, UK, or the University of Lincoln, UK.  
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3.1.2 Materials and Procedure 
This experiment used images of the same five male Hollywood celebrities used in 
Experiment 1. Here, the images were cropped still frames from specific films. The images 
were obtained both from a Google Image search specifying each actor and each film, and by 
taking stills from scenes from the films themselves. This allowed us to establish which 
specific images participants had previously seen, based on which films they had watched. For 
each of the five celebrities, we took three images from each of five films, resulting in 15 
images per identity. Participants were shown the name of each celebrity and began by 
indicating familiarity with each celebrity on a 1-7 scale. Participants then viewed all 75 
images (15 per celebrity) in a random order and rated each image for likeness on a 1-7 scale 
(Ôvery bad likenessÕ to Ôvery good likenessÕ). Participants rated each image once.  
 
Following the ratings task, participants completed a speeded name verification task. As in 
Experiment 1, the images for the name/face match trials in the speeded name verification task 
were those which had been previously rated. The images used for the mismatch trials were 
five images of three of the other identities, and as in Experiment 1, these were novel images 
which had not been seen during the likeness ratings phase of the experiment. Participants 
were then shown the names of each of the 25 films from which the stimuli for the experiment 
were taken. Participants were asked to indicate which films they had seen in their entirety, 
i.e., not simply the trailer or some images from the film. It is possible that participants who 
had not seen a specific film may still have been exposed to images from that film in trailers or 
promotional images. Participants who had seen a given film, however, had definitely been 
exposed to our experimental stimuli before, and would have had more experience of each of 
the actors portraying each of the roles than people who had not seen the film. Therefore, by 
asking participants which films they had seen, we attempted to account for actual prior 
experience. 
 
3.2 Results and Discussion 
All participants reported being familiar with all five identities in this experiment, although, as 
before, the amount of familiarity varied. As in the previous experiment, we began by 
correlating familiarity with mean likeness ratings using an Ôaverage of correlationsÕ approach 
in order to understand mechanisms at the individual level. There was a positive correlation 
between familiarity and mean likeness score (mean z = .371, t(29) = 3.741, p = .001, 
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d = .683). As in Experiment 1 above, the more familiar participants were with the celebrities, 
the higher the mean likeness rating they gave to images of those celebrities.  
 
Participants reported having seen a mean of 9 out of 25 films (range 3-19). In order to 
establish whether our film image set related to familiarity, for each participant we recorded 
the number of films they reported having seen for each celebrity, and correlated this with 
their familiarity rating for that celebrity. This gave us five correlation values for each 
participant, which we converted to z scores and averaged together, resulting in one 
familiarity/films-seen correlation value for each participant. We compared these values to 
zero using a one-sample t-test. We found a significant positive correlation between the 
number of films seen for each identity and self-reported familiarity with that identity (mean z-
score = .288, t(28) = 2.157, p = .040, d = .400). We also took the mean likeness rating given 
to images from films each participant had seen, and the mean likeness rating for images from 
films they had not seen. A paired-samples t-test showed a significant difference between 
likeness ratings for images from films participants had seen (mean = 5.27) and images from 
films participants had not seen (mean = 4.80), t(31) = 4.534, p < .001, d = .814. This indicates 
that the film images used in this experiment reflect participantsÕ actual exposure with each 
celebrity. The more familiar they were with a celebrity, the more of our chosen films they had 
seen, and they rated images from films they had seen as a better likeness than images from 
films they had not seen. 
 
Error rates for the speeded name verification task in this experiment were low (mean of 6.56 
errors from 75 trials per participant). We excluded trials for which the RT was 2 SDs above 
or below that participantÕs mean RT (M = 3.62 trials excluded per participant). Again, for RT 
analyses, we took RTs only for name/face match pairs in the speeded name verification task 
to which participants responded correctly. As in Experiment 1, for each participant we 
correlated their familiarity ratings for the five celebrities with their mean reaction time per 
celebrity in the speeded name verification task. We then converted these Spearman r values 
to z and averaged across the five z values to obtain one familiarity/RT correlation value for 
each participant. As in Experiment 1 above, there was a significantly negative correlation 
between familiarity and mean RT (mean z = -.416, t(31) = 4.194, p < .001, d = .741). This 
indicates that participants were faster to identify the celebrities with whom they were more 
familiar. For each participant, we also correlated their RT for each image with their likeness 
rating for that image, separately for each celebrity. This gave us five correlation values for 
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each participant. Again, by converting these to z scores, we could then take the mean of these 
values, obtaining one likeness/RT correlation value for each participant. Again, as in 
Experiment 1 above, there was a significant negative correlation between mean likeness 
rating and mean RT (mean z = -.087) t(31) = 3.427, p = .002, d = .606). We find faster 
reaction times for individual images which have previously been rated as a good likeness.  
 
In this experiment, we used images of celebrities in particular films, allowing us to accurately 
establish which specific images participants had already been exposed to. Images from films 
that participants had seen received higher likeness ratings than images from films participants 
had not seen, and the number of films seen was positively correlated with familiarity. This 
shows that the perception of likeness is directly related to exposure. Here, we have shown 
that images of each celebrity which received higher likeness ratings were also responded to 
faster in a speeded name verification task. This is the first clear evidence that the concept of 
likeness, expressed through ratings, corresponds to the observerÕs own representation of what 
a person looks like.  
 
What we have not addressed in these first two experiments, however, is the nature of 
participantsÕ own representations of each celebrity. We have argued that our likeness rating 
and speeded name verification tasks show higher ratings and faster RTs for images which 
more closely resemble each participantÕs own idea of what the celebrity looks like. One 
previous paper has suggested that we may recognise some familiar identities from specific 
iconic images, making these images a candidate for our mental representation of these 
familiar people (Carbon, 2008). Other research has suggested that face averages provide 
stable representations of people, and so may be a candidate for our representations of familiar 
people (Burton et al., 2005; Jenkins & Burton, 2011). In a final experiment, we compare 
these two candidate representations, and ask whether face averages or iconic images receive 
higher likeness ratings than other exemplars. 
 
4. Experiment 3 Ð Iconic images and averages 
 
In this final experiment, we sought to establish whether iconic images or average images are 
judged to be a good likeness of celebrities. We selected three celebrities for whom an iconic 
face image existed, and three who did not have an iconic image. We also made an average 
image of each celebrity by averaging together images of that person. Participants first rated 
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each image for likeness, and then completed a speeded name verification task for each image 
of each identity.  
 
4.1 Method 
 
4.1.1 Participants 
Fifteen participants (3 men; mean age 27 years, rage: 20-39 years) from the University of 
Western Australia took part in the image selection phase of the experiment. Forty-two 
participants (17 men; mean age: 27 years, range: 18-48 years) took part in the main 
experiment. These were students or other members of the University of York, UK, and the 
University of Lincoln, UK.  
 
4.1.2 Materials and Procedure 
In the image selection phase of this experiment, we used ten images of each of 16 celebrities. 
Eight of these celebrities were selected by the experimenters as potentially having iconic 
images which best represented that person (Che Guevara, Albert Einstein, Adolf Hitler, John 
F Kennedy, Marilyn Monroe, Audrey Hepburn, Britney Spears, and Twiggy). Eight other 
celebrities were chosen as probably not having a single iconic image which best represented 
them (Harry Styles, Justin Bieber, Kanye West, Barack Obama, Adele, Hilary Clinton, Taylor 
Swift, and Jennifer Lopez). Participants were presented with an array of ten images of each 
identity, one identity at a time. The images were numbered onscreen from 1 to 10, and 
participants were instructed to record via button press which was the most iconic image of 
each individual, with the instructions reading ÒFor each of the following people, please pick 
out the image that you think is the most iconic. That is, the image that you feel most 
epitomises themÓ. The name of each celebrity was presented above their particular image 
array. If participants did not recognise a celebrity, they were instructed to proceed to the next 
celebrity without making a response. 
 
Identities were deemed to have an iconic image if 10 or more of the 15 participants selected 
the same image as iconic. Identities were classified as not having an iconic image if 5 
participants or fewer selected the same image as iconic. For the three identities we selected as 
having iconic images (Che Guevara, Albert Einstein, Marilyn Monroe), a mean of 11.0 
participants chose the same image as iconic. This was then selected as the iconic image of 
this identity for the main part of the experiment. The mean number of different images 
16	
	
selected as iconic across participants for each identity was 2.67. For the three identities we 
selected as not having iconic images (Harry Styles, Justin Bieber, Kanye West), a mean of 
4.0 participants chose the same image as iconic. For these non-iconic identities, the mean 
number of images chosen as iconic across participants for each celebrity was 7.0. 
 
The images used in the main experiment were the ten images of each of the three iconic and 
three non-iconic celebrities (iconic referring to those who were selected in the initial phase of 
the experiment as having an iconic image, non-iconic referring to those for whom there was 
not an iconic image). We also created a computer-generated average of the ten images for 
each identity separately using Psychomorph software (Tidemann, Burt & Perrett, 2001).  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Stimuli used in Experiment 1. Left to right Ð iconic image of Albert Einstein, three 
of the further nine exemplars used of Einstein, and the average of all 10 exemplars of 
Einstein. [Images are labelled for reuse under creative commons licensing.] 
 
For the ratings part of the experiment, participants viewed all 66 images (ten exemplars and 
one average image per identity). The images were presented in a random order, with each 
trial presented along with the instruction ÒHow good a likeness of X is this?Ó, where X is the 
name of the identity being shown. As above, participants rated each image from 1 (very low) 
to 7 (very high). After a short break, participants completed the speeded naming part of the 
experiment. There were 11 match trials per identity, each showing the person named (the 
exemplars and average image previously rated for likeness). There were 10 mismatch trials 
per name, which showed a foil celebrity chosen to match the sex, ethnicity, and approximate 
age of the named celebrity (foil IDs: Che GuevaraÐJohn F Kennedy, Albert EinsteinÐ
Anthony Hopkins, Marilyn MonroeÐGwyneth Paltrow, Harry StylesÐMatt Damon, Justin 
17	
	
BieberÐBrad Pitt, Kanye WestÐWill Smith). The images were presented centrally, measuring 
5.2 cm x 7.8 cm onscreen.  
 
4.2 Results and Discussion 
We analysed the likeness ratings separately for the iconic and non-iconic identities. For 
iconic identities (those identities for whom an iconic image was established in the initial 
image selection experiment), we took the mean likeness rating for the average image, the 
iconic image (as agreed upon by the 15 participants in the initial image selection experiment), 
and the nine other exemplars across participants. Table 1 contains the mean likeness ratings 
for the different image types. Data for identities with (iconic IDs) and without iconic images 
(non-iconic IDs) were analysed separately.  
 
Table 1. Mean likeness ratings for different image types 
Image Type Iconic IDs Non-Iconic IDs 
Iconic Images 6.46  [6.27, 6.66] - 
Exemplars 5.11  [4.91, 5.32] 5.60 [5.38, 5.82] 
Averages 3.87  [3.49, 4.23] 4.23 [3.89, 4.56] 
Note: Iconic and non-iconic IDs are those who do and do not, respectively, have an iconic 
image, as agreed by the initial participant sample. 95% CIs given in square brackets 
 
A one-way ANOVA for likeness ratings of iconic identities showed a significant difference 
in ratings between the three image types (average, iconic image, exemplars), 
F(2,82) = 152.45, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .79, with follow-up Tukey HSD comparisons showing 
significantly higher likeness ratings for iconic images than exemplars and averages, and 
higher likeness ratings for exemplars than averages (all ps < .05). For identities without 
iconic images, a related means t-test showed significantly higher likeness ratings for 
exemplars than averages, t(41) = 8.71, p < .001, d = 1.34. These results show that for 
identities for whom there is an iconic image, that image is rated as a better likeness than other 
images or the average image. For identities for whom there is not an iconic image, exemplars 
receive higher likeness ratings than average images. 
 
Next, we investigated the relationship between ratings and reaction times (RT) on the 
speeded name verification of each celebrity image. Error rates for this task were very low 
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(mean of 4.19 errors from 126 trials per participant). We excluded trials for which the RT was 
2SDs above or below that participantÕs mean RT (M = 4.38 trials excluded per participant). 
For the RT analysis, we took RTs only for name/face match pairs in the speeded name 
verification task to which participants responded correctly. For each participant, we 
correlated their RTs for each image with their likeness rating for that image, separately for 
each celebrity. This gave us six correlation values for each participant, one for each celebrity. 
We then converted these Spearman r values to z and averaged across the six z values to 
obtain one likeness/RT correlation value for each participant.  These values were then 
compared to zero using a one-sample t-test. There was a significant negative correlation 
between mean likeness rating and mean RT (mean z-score = -.120, t(41) = 4.53, p < .001, 
d = 0.699). This shows that participants were faster to verify images which they had 
previously rated as a good likeness.  
 
To examine RTs for speeded name verification further, we calculated mean RTs for the 
different image types across participants. Reaction times on the speeded name verification 
task for each image type for both iconic and non-iconic identities are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Mean RTs (ms) for different image types 
Image Type Iconic IDs Non-Iconic IDs 
Iconic Images 537 [494, 559] - 
Exemplars 570 [541, 598] 574  [540, 607] 
Averages 602  [551, 651] 616  [576,567] 
Note: Iconic and non-iconic IDs are those who do and do not, respectively, have an iconic 
image, as agreed by the initial participant sample. 95% CIs given in square brackets. 
 
A one-way ANOVA for identities with iconic images showed a significant difference in RTs 
between the three image types, F(2,82) = 9.15, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .18, with follow-up Tukey 
HSD comparisons showing significantly faster RTs for iconic images than both exemplars 
and averages (both ps < .05). There was not a significant difference in RTs between 
exemplars and averages (p < .05). For identities without iconic images, a related means t-test 
showed that RTs for average images were significantly slower than for exemplars 
t(41) = 2.69, p = .01, d = .415. These results show that iconic images were responded to faster 
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than averages, and the higher likeness ratings given to exemplars than averages translated 
into significantly faster RTs for the identities who did not have iconic images.  
 
The results of this final experiment show that the perception of likeness is tied to a mental 
representation of a person insofar as there is a correlation between the likeness rating given to 
images and the speed at which they are recognised. In this experiment, we established three 
identities for whom there exists an iconic image. For these identities, the iconic images were 
given significantly higher likeness ratings than other, non-iconic images or an average image. 
The results also show that for identities without an iconic image, the average image is given a 
lower likeness rating than exemplars. The speeded name verification task showed faster RTs 
for iconic images than other exemplars and averages, and for some identities, slower RTs for 
averages than exemplars.  
 
This exploration of likeness does seem to offer a route in to studying the central problem of 
familiar face representation.  This experiment does not support the proposal that average 
faces are good candidate representations for recognition, in contrast to earlier proposals using 
different techniques (e.g. Burton et al, 2005).  However, for familiar faces with iconic 
images, these do seem to have some privileged access to recognition, rendering them 
candidates for representations of those particular individuals.  Of course, this leaves open a 
number of problems.  Iconic images seem to be a property of only a rather restricted class of 
known individuals.  It seems rather unlikely that our representations of personally familiar 
faces (family members etc) would be tied to particular images.  Furthermore, as discussed 
above, only a rather restricted number of famous faces can be well-represented by particular 
iconic photos.  Nevertheless, this finding does highlight the potential importance of Ôpicture-
basedÕ representations.  Such representations are sometimes held to be at the root of 
unfamiliar face processing, but discarded for a more abstract coding as a face becomes 
familiar (Hancock, Bruce & Burton, 2000). In contrast, the findings reported here suggest a 
lasting influence of particular images for some familiar faces.  
 
 
5. General Discussion 
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In three experiments, we have shown that the perception of Ôwhat makes a good likenessÕ is 
tied to observersÕ representations of a person, and that these representations differ across 
observers based on their own experience.  The results of Experiments 1 and 2 show that the 
more familiar we are with someone, the more we judge images of them to be a good likeness, 
and the faster we respond to images of them in a speeded name verification task. Across all 
three experiments, we have shown that higher likeness ratings for specific images also 
correlate with faster RTs for those images. These results suggest that observers are making 
coherent likeness judgements which do map on to the speed with which they recognise 
people, as well as their self-reported familiarity with those people. The results of Experiment 
1 show that when observers rate images for likeness twice, they are quite consistent, and that 
64% of the variance in likeness judgements can be explained by observersÕ private variance 
across images, with 36% of the variance shared across participants. This suggests that what 
constitutes a good likeness is to a greater extent particular to individual observers rather than 
being a generalised concept across people.  
 
Experiment 2 provides further evidence for the idiosyncrasy of likeness judgements by tying 
judgements to specific instances of each celebrity that participants either had or had not 
previously seen by using images from films. The number of films seen for each celebrity 
correlated with familiarity with that celebrity. Moreover, images from films that participants 
had seen were rated as a higher likeness than images from films they had not seen.  
 
In Experiment 3, we questioned what form our representations of familiar people take. We 
showed that for identities for whom an iconic image exists, that image is rated as a better 
likeness than other images. It has previously been suggested that the variability between 
different instances of familiar people is condensed into a stable average of those instances, 
and that this is how we represent familiar people (Burton et al., 2005; Jenkins & Burton, 
2011). We therefore hypothesised that an average image may be rated as a higher likeness 
than other images. Instead, the results of Experiment 3 showed that average images are in fact 
rated as a poorer likeness than these exemplars. Moreover, average images were not 
responded to faster in a speeded name verification task, suggesting that they are not easier to 
recognise than other images of an identity. Our average images comprised ten instances of 
each person, taken from an internet search. The first two experiments in this paper show that 
idiosyncratic exposure to images plays a role in the perception of likeness, and so we cannot 
rule out that an average of previously seen images, or an average giving higher weighting to 
21	
	
recently-seen images would be rated as a good likeness. Of course, this experiment used a 
relatively small number of identities, and further experimentation will be necessary to assess 
the generality of this result.     
 
We have used celebrity images as the familiar faces in the studies presented here. Naturally, 
this does not imply that the notion of familiarity is binary. For example, Carbon (2008) 
suggests that familiarity follows a three-tier hierarchy: personally familiar, famous and 
unfamiliar. Of course, familiarity is much more nuanced than this, and is a multi-faceted 
phenomenon which has been surprisingly little-studied in the literature on face recognition. It 
is important therefore to acknowledge that our manipulation of familiarity is very coarse and 
that more subtle variation is likely to be important Ð especially in personal life where 
familiarity is associated with other social roles and relationships.  However, the results do 
make a start by demonstrating that familiarity is an important contributor to the notion of 
likeness.  
 
Our results further suggest that the more familiar we are with someone, the more robust a 
representation of them we have, allowing us to easily incorporate new images of that person 
and judging each to be a good likeness. This ties in with previous work showing more 
consistent social judgements for different images of familiar compared to unfamiliar faces 
(Jenkins et al., 2011). There is a growing body of research which suggests that exposure to 
variability in a face helps us to learn what a new person looks like (Burton, Kramer, Ritchie, 
& Jenkins, 2016; Dowsett, Sandford, & Burton, 2016; Murphy, Ipser Gaigg, & Cook, 2015). 
In fact, we have recently shown that learning a new person from highly variable face images 
is more efficient than learning a person from the same number of images which show a 
smaller range of variability. Our results showed that learning new people from images 
varying in lighting, age, and hair styles produced benefits on a number of subsequent 
recognition tasks compared with learning from images which simply showed changes in pose 
and expression (Ritchie & Burton, 2017). The results reported in this paper support the 
converging evidence that exposure to variability within images of the same person allows us 
to recognise them in multiple novel images, because here, we have shown that the more 
familiar we are with someone, the more we will consider multiple varied images of them to 
be a good likeness. Repeated varied exposure to a person creates familiarity, as well as a 
tolerance for different images of that person. Heeding this intrinsic link between face 
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learning, familiarity, and the perception of likeness is key to furthering our understanding of 
the differences between familiar and unfamiliar face processing.  
 
The effect of familiarity on likeness ratings is of particular relevance when considering the 
process of applying for a passport. Passport-issuing offices around the world require the 
applicant or someone familiar with them to verify the likeness of the passport image 
(Australian Passport Office, 2012; Passport Canada, 2013; HM Passport Office, 2014). Our 
results showing the correlation between familiarity and mean likeness rating for a range of 
images suggest that someone who knows the passport applicant well is likely to be more 
tolerant of an image which others may not consider to be a good likeness. We could therefore 
suggest, based on these results, that familiar people should not be asked to verify passport 
images. Recent research has shown that individuals asked to choose their own ID images do 
not pick the optimal photos.  Instead, observers who have been briefly familiarised with the 
individual choose photos which are subsequently best matched by unfamiliar viewers. (White 
et al., 2016).  It has been shown that a number of professional groups, such as police officers 
(Burton, Wilson, Cowan & Bruce, 1999), and passport officers (White, Kemp, Jenkins, 
Matheson & Burton, 2014; Writh & Carbon, 2017) perform surprisingly poorly at unfamiliar 
face matching, and show no association between experience and accuracy.  We therefore 
suggest that images verified as a Ôgood likenessÕ by familiar viewers may be difficult for 
unfamiliar observers, such as passport or police officers, to recognise. 
 
These experiments provide the first systematic investigation of the perception of likeness, and 
the first evidence showing that the representations we form of familiar people are 
idiosyncratic and tied to our individual experiences of these people.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23	
	
Acknowledgements	
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research 
Council under the European UnionÕs Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013) / ERC 
Grant Agreement n.323262 to A. Mike Burton. 	
  
24	
	
References 
 
Allen, H., Brady, N., & Tredoux, C. (2009). Perception of Ôbest likenessÕ to highly familiar 
faces of self and friend. Perception, 38, 1821Ð1830. 
 
Australian Passport Office (2012). Photograph guidelines. Retrieved from 
https://www.passports.gov.au/web/requirements/photos.aspx 
 
Back, M. D., Stopfer, J. M., Vazire, S., Gaddis, S., Schmukle, S. C., Egloff, B., & Gosling, S. 
D. (2010). Facebook profiles reflect actual personality, not self-
idealization. Psychological science, 21(3), 372-374. 
 
Benson, P.J., & Perrett, D. I. (1991). Perception and recognition of photographic quality 
facial caricatures: Implications for the recognition of natural images. European Journal 
of Cognitive Psychology, 3(1), 105-135. 
 
Bruce, V., Henderson, Z., Newman, C., & Burton, A. M. (2001). Matching identities of 
familiar and unfamiliar faces caught on CCTV images. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Applied, 7(3), 207Ð218. 
 
Bruce, V., Ness, H., Hancock, P. J. B., Newman, C., & Rarity, J. (2002). Four heads are 
better than one: Combining face composites yields improvements in face likeness. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(5), 894-902. 
 
Burton, A. M., Jenkins, R., Hancock, P. J. B., & White, D. (2005). Robust representations for 
face recognition: The power of averages. Cognitive Psychology, 51(3), 256-284. 
 
Burton, A. M., Kramer, R. S. S., Ritchie, K. L., & Jenkins, R. (2016). Identity from variation: 
Representations of faces derived from multiple instances. Cognitive Science, 40, 202-
223.  
 
Burton, A. M., Wilson, S., Cowan, M., & Bruce, V. (1999). Face recognition in poor-quality 
video: evidence from security surveillance. Psychological Science, 10(3), 243-248.  
 
25	
	
Carbon, C.-C. (2008). Famous faces as icons. The illusion of being an expert in the 
recognition of famous faces. Perception, 37, 801-806. 
 
Clutterbuck, R., & Johnston, R. A. (2002). Exploring levels of face familiarity by using an 
indirect face-matching measure. Perception, 31, 985Ð994.  
 
Clutterbuck, R., & Johnston, R. A. (2004). Matching as an index of face familiarity. Visual 
Cognition, 11(7), 857Ð869. 
 
Dowsett, A. J., Sandford, A., & Burton, A. M. (2016). Face learning with multiple images 
leads to fast acquisition of familiarity for specific individuals. The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 69(1), 1-10. 
 
Frowd, C. D., White, D., Kemp, R. I., Jenkins, R., Nawaz, K., & Herold, K. (2014). 
Constructing faces from memory: the impact of image likeness and prototypical 
representations. Journal of Forensic Practice, 16(4), 243-256. 
 
Hancock, P. J. B., Bruce, V., & Burton, A. M. (2000). Recognition of unfamiliar faces. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(9), 330Ð337. 
 
Hay, D. C., Young, A. W., & Ellis, A. W. (1991). Routes through the face recognition 
system. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A, 43(4), 761-791. 
 
HM Passport Office (2014). Countersigning passport application and photos. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/countersigning-passport-applications 
 
Hnekopp, J. (2006). Once more: Is beauty in the eye of the beholder? Relative contributions 
of private and shared taste to judgements of facial attractiveness. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 32(2), 199-209. 
 
Jenkins, R., & Burton, A. M. (2011). Stable face representations. Philosophical Transactions 
of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 366(1571), 1671Ð1683.  
 
26	
	
Jenkins, R., White, D., van Montfort, X. & Burton, A.M. (2011). Variability in photos of the 
same face. Cognition, 121, 313-323. 
 
Kramer, R. S. S., Gottwald, V. M., Dixon, T. A., & Ward, R. (2012). Different cues of 
personality and health from the face and gait of women. Evolutionary Psychology, 10(2), 
271-295. 
 
Kramer, R. S. S., Ritchie, K. L., & Burton, A. M. (2015). Viewers extract the mean from sets 
of images of the same person: A route to face learning. Journal of Vision, 15(4)1, 1-9. 
 
Laurence, S., & Mondloch, C. J. (2016). ThatÕs my teacher! ChildrenÕs ability to recognize 
personally familiar and unfamiliar faces improves with age. Journal of Experimental 
Child Psychology, 143, 123-138. 
 
Lee, J. L., & Perrett, D. I. (2000). Manipulation of colour and shape information and its 
consequence upon recognition and best-likeness judgments. Perception, 29, 1291Ð1312. 
 
Leikas, S., Verkasalo, M., & Lnnqvist, J. E. (2013). Posing personality: Is it possible to 
enact the Big Five traits in photographs? Journal of Research in Personality, 47, 15-21. 
 
 
Monin, B., & Oppenheimer, D. M. (2005). Correlated averages vs. averaged correlations: 
Demonstrating the warm glow heuristic beyond aggregation. Social Cognition, 23(3), 
257-278. 
 
Murphy, J., Ipser, A., Gaigg, S., & Cook, R. (2015). Exemplar variance supports robust 
learning of facial identity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 41(3), 577Ð581. 
 
Oosterhof, N. N., & Todorov, A. (2008). The functional basis of face evaluation. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 105, 11087-11092. 
 
Passport Canada (2013). Photos: rules for Canadian passport photos. Retrieved from: 
http://www.ppt.gc.ca/info/photos.aspx 
27	
	
 
Rhodes, G., Brennan, S., & Carey, S. (1987). Identification and ratings of caricatures: 
Implications for mental representations of faces. Cognitive Psychology, 19(4), 473-497. 
 
Ritchie, K. L., & Burton, A. M. (2017). Learning faces from variability. The Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology. Doi: 10.1080/17470218.2015.1136656  
 
Ritchie, K. L., Smith, F. G., Jenkins, R., Bindemann, M. White, D., & Burton, A. M. (2015). 
Viewers base estimates of face matching accuracy on their own familiarity: Explaining 
the photo-ID paradox. Cognition, 141, 161-169. 
 
Robertson, D. J., Kramer, R. S. S., & Burton, A. M. (2015). Face averages enhance user 
recognition for smartphone security. PLoS One, 10, e0119460. 
 
Sutherland, C. A. M., Oldmeadow, J. A., Santos, I. M., Towler, J., Burt, M. D., & Young, A. 
W. (2013). Social inferences from faces: Ambient images generate a three-dimensional 
model. Cognition, 127, 105-118. 
 
Tidemann, B., Burt, M., & Perrett, D. I. (2001). Prototyping and transforming facial textures 
for perception research. Computer Graphics and Applications, IEEE, 21(5), 42-50. 
 
White, D., Burton, A. L., & Kemp, R. I. (2016). Not looking yourself: The cost of self-
selecting photographs for identity verification. British Journal of Psychology. Advance 
online publication. 
 
White, D., Kemp, R. I., Jenkins, R., Matheson, M., & Burton, A. M. (2014). Passport 
officersÕ errors in face matching. PLoS One, 9, e103510. 
 
Wirth, B. E., & Carbon, C.-C. (2017). An easy game for frauds? Effects of professional 
experience and time pressure on passport-matching performance. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Applied, 23(2), 138-157. 
 
